ASEAN i potęgi światowe by Zyblikiewicz, Lubomir
PRACE NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU EKONOMICZNEGO WE WROCŁAWIU 
RESEARCH PAPERS OF WROCŁAW UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS      nr 413 ● 2015
 ISSN 1899-3192
e-ISSN 2392-0041
Dimensions of Regional Processes in the Asia-Pacific Region
Lubomir W. Zyblikiewicz
Jagiellonian University, professor emeritus 
e-mail: Lubomir.Zyblikiewicz@uj.edu.pl
THE ASEAN AND THE GREAT POWERS
ASEAN I POTĘGI ŚWIATOWE
DOI: 10.15611/pn.2015.413.10
JEL Classification: F4, F5, F6
Summary: The paper finished in October of 2015 outlines successively 1) the geo-economic 
and geopolitical position of the ASEAN and the member countries in the years 1980-2014, 
2) the origins and the institutional development of the ASEAN, with taking into consideration
of other, to some extent competitive, projects of regional cooperation, and 3) the connections,
with the merchandise trade as a driving component, between, on the one hand, the ASEAN as
the entity and the most important South-East Asian countries and, on the other hand, their four
most important outside economic and geopolitical partners (in alphabetical order, China, the
European Union, Japan and the United States). In the pattern of these external connections
more and more easily is possible to identify the exceptional role played by the United States
and China. In the case of China, we should take into consideration the Chinese diaspora and
geo-economic and geopolitical impact of the Mekong River.
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Streszczenie: Artykuł przygotowany w październiku 2015 r. przedstawia kolejno 1) pozycję 
ASEAN i krajów go tworzących z punktu widzenia geoekonomii i geopolityki w latach 1980-
-2014, 2) zarys powstania i rozwoju instytucjonalnego ASEAN, z uwzględnieniem innych,
poniekąd konkurencyjnych, inicjatyw szeroko rozumianej współpracy regionalnej oraz
3) wybrane powiązania, przede wszystkim handlowe, ASEAN i najważniejszych krajów Azji
Południowo-Wschodniej, zwłaszcza z czterema najważniejszymi partnerami, gospodarczymi
i geopolitycznymi (w alfabetycznej kolejności – Chinami, Japonią, Stanami Zjednoczonymi
i Unią Europejską). W coraz wyraźniej wyłaniającym się obrazie powiązań zewnętrznych
współcześnie wyjątkową rolę odgrywają Stany Zjednoczone i Chiny. W przypadku Chin,
dodatkowo uwzględniać należy chińską diasporę oraz geoekonomiczne i geopolityczne
znaczenie rzeki Mekong dla Chin i Azji Południowo-Wschodniej.
Słowa kluczowe: gospodarka globalna, ASEAN, regionalna integracja, relacje dwustronne 
w Azji.
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1. Introduction
In order to see the international role of the ASEAN and of its member countries, as 
well as their relationship with the chosen great powers, we should ask some basic 
questions. The first ones are obviously about their shares (aggregate and individual) 
in the world area, population, GDP PPP, exports and imports, FDI inward stocks and 
inflows. In the case of trade and FDI values, it would be necessary to distinguish 
definitely the ASEAN area and the outside world. Taking into due consideration also 
the issues of the geopolitics, the same endeavour should be undertaken with the data 
on the military expenditures. Although the ASEAN region is so strongly connected 
with its outside world, in reality only the few partners appear to be significant. So it 
would be possible to confine the attention in the second part of the paper to the 
United States, China, Japan, the European Union, India and Korea. It seems 
worthwhile to assess the value of the variables at the given time, as well as their 
dynamics.
2. The ASEAN and its countries’ position in the world economy 
and politics 1980-2014
Even with the superficial look, it is impossible not to notice huge diversity. Indonesia 
is without any doubt the only ASEAN country deserving to be a member of the 
Group of the Twenty. Although the share of its population, almost 90 per cent 
Muslim, is decreasing, its demographic supremacy is in the region unquestionable 
(42.3 in 1950, 40.7 in 2014). The Philippines (by the way, more than 80 percent 
Table 1. The area (thousand sq. km) 
Country Area
Brunei Darussalam 5.8
Cambodia 181.0
Indonesia 1,910.9
Lao PDR 236.8
Malaysia 330.8
Myanmar 676.6
The Philippines 300.0
Singapore 0.7
Thailand 513.1
Vietnam 331.0
ASEAN 4,486,7
World 134,324.7
ASEAN % 3.3
Source: World Bank [September 2015].
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Roman Catholic), the most demographically dynamic country (leaving aside Brunei 
Darussalam), increased its share from 11.3 to 15.9 per cent. Following them are 
Vietnam, with the mixture of different of religious convictions, and Thailand, with 
more than 95 per cent Buddhists. 
Very interesting results brings about application of the concept promulgated by 
McKinsey & Company, i.e. the consuming middle class 20,000 – 70,000 US$ (annual 
household-income, prices of 2005). According to the report, Understanding ASEAN: 
Seven things you need to know already some 67 million households in ASEAN states 
are a part of the consuming class, and the number could almost double to 125 million 
households by 2025, making ASEAN “a pivotal consumer market of the future” 
[Vinayak et al. 2014, p. 6]. This way of thinking leads even further. 
The opportunity is to be a bridge and a meeting point for China and India, the 
most interesting countries for centuries, if not for thousands of years. Indochina 
(strikingly meaningful name) contains, amongst the ten ASEAN members six: 
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Yet, under closer 
scrutiny we could see also in Indonesia and Singapore huge historic and present 
capacities for being the liaisons for China and India, as well as for other great powers 
of the world economy and trade. And this report not only repeats the thesis that “the 
region sits at the crossroads of many global flows”. There we read that “by 2025, 
more than half of the world’s consuming class will live within a five-hour flight of 
Myanmar” [Vinayak et al., p. 6].
Table 2. The population (thousands)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Brunei 
Darussalam 48 82 130 193 257 295 331 362 393 417
Cambodia 4,433 5,722 7,022 6,718 9,009 10,694 12,198 13,32 14,364 15,328
Indonesia 69,543 90,138 114,835 147,49 181,437 196,958 211,54 226,255 241,613 254,455
Lao PDR 1,683 2,12 2,686 3,253 4,248 4,858 5,343 5,745 6,261 6,689
Malaysia 6,11 8,161 10,909 13,834 18,211 20,725 23,421 25,796 28,12 29,902
Myanmar 17,527 21,486 27,166 34,471 42,007 44,711 47,67 49,985 51,733 53,437
The 
Philippines 18,58 26,273 35,805 47,397 61,947 69,836 77,932 86,141 93,039 99,139
Singapore 1,022 1,634 2,074 2,415 3,016 3,483 3,918 4,496 5,079 5,507
Thailand 20,71 27,397 36,885 47,385 56,583 59,266 62,693 65,864 66,692 67,726
Vietnam 24,81 32,671 43,407 54,373 68,21 75,199 80,286 84,204 88,358 92,423
ASEAN 164,466 215,684 280,919 357,529 444,925 486,025 525,332 562,168 595,652 625,023
World 2,525,149 3,018,344 3,682,488 4,439,632 5,309,668 5,735,123 6,126,622 6,519,636 6,929,725 7,265,786
ASEAN % 6.51 7.15 7.63 8.05 8.38 8.47 8.57 8.62 8.6 8.6
Source: United Nations [2015].
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Table 3. GDP PPP shares of the world’s total
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Brunei Darussalam n/a 0.048 0.045 0.04 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028
Cambodia n/a 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.035 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.046
Indonesia 1.584 1.961 2.265 1.955 2.034 2.142 2.249 2.273 2.321 2.387 2.439 2.48
Lao PDR n/a 0.016 0.018 0.02 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.032
Malaysia 0.343 0.448 0.568 0.596 0.619 0.636 0.628 0.641 0.648 0.664 0.674 0.691
Myanmar n/a n/a n/a 0.106 0.16 0.183 0.194 0.194 0.197 0.205 0.215 0.224
The Philippines 0.695 0.598 0.538 0.533 0.551 0.562 0.57 0.583 0.581 0.602 0.625 0.641
Singapore 0.164 0.252 0.308 0.336 0.353 0.372 0.371 0.407 0.415 0.417 0.421 0.419
Thailand 0.56 0.871 1.059 0.901 0.954 0.943 0.924 0.946 0.911 0.941 0.937 0.913
Vietnam 0.182 0.234 0.28 0.326 0.383 0.406 0.429 0.433 0.443 0.452 0.461 0.473
ASEAN 3.541 4.401 5.059 4.8 5.111 5.308 5.431 5.544 5.585 5.74 5.848 5.919
ASEAN-5 3.364 4.113 4.711 4.31 4.541 4.688 4.8 4.877 4.903 5.046 5.135 5.199
Source: International Monetary Fund [2015a].
Table 4. GDP 2014 value (US$ billion)
GDP CP GDP  PPP GDP PPP per capita
Brunei Darussalam 17.1 33.0 79890.18
Cambodia 16.6 50.2 3275.67
Indonesia 888.6 2685.9 10651.34
Lao PDR 11.7 34.5 5005.83
Malaysia 338.1 769.4 25145.35
Myanmar 63.1 244.4 4752.40
The Philippines 284.6 693.4 6973.67
Singapore 307.9 454.3 83065.59
Thailand 404.8 1069.6 15578.56
Vietnam 185.9 512.6 5655.79
Source: International Monetary Fund [2015b].
Only a few comments should be enough. The share of the ASEAN countries in 
the world product has been increasing very quickly, definitely more rapidly than the 
ASEAN population’ share. These results have been achieved in spite of three short-
term downturns during these 35 years. Of course the most known and especially 
painful for South East Asia was the last one, which begun during the summer of 1997 
in Thailand. Having reached the low point in 1999 (4,751, or 0.49 percentage point 
lower than in 1996), the share has started to grow strongly and continuously.
Although there are various ways to categorize the ASEAN countries, particularly 
convincing appears the separation by the IMF of the ASEAN-5. This group consists 
of five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (the 
last one has become the ASEAN member lately, in July of 1995). It is possible also 
to see that although the share of the ASEAN as an entity is growing, it is not always 
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so with the share of particular countries. Thailand, the second economy in the region, 
appears to be in difficult situation in the recent years. Otherwise, Vietnam is closing 
a gap strikingly quickly. 
At first glance, the ASEAN role in the world trade seems to look better than in 
the case of the world production and change in the right direction. But in the ASEAN’s 
trade, some specific features should attract our attention. 
Table 5. Merchandise exports (billion US$)
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Brunei 
Darussalam 4.6 2.2 2.4 3.9 6.2 10.3 7.2 8.9 12.5 13.0 11.4 10.5
Cambodia 0.02 0.1 0.9 1.4 3.1 4.7 4.2 5.1 6.7 7.8 9.2 10.8
Indonesia 21.9 25.7 45.4 65.4 87.0 139.6 119.6 157.8 203.5 190.0 182.6 176.3
Lao PDR 0.03 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.7
Malaysia 12.9 29.5 73.9 98.2 141.6 199.4 157.2 198.6 228.1 227.5 228.3 234.1
Myanmar 0.5 0.3 0.9 1.6 3.8 6.9 6.7 8.7 9.2 8.9 11.2 11.0
The Philippines 5.7 8.1 17.5 38.1 41.3 49.1 38.4 51.5 48.3 52.1 56.7 62.1
Singapore 19.4 52.7 118.3 137.8 229.6 338.2 269.8 351.9 409.5 408.4 410.3 409.8
Thailand 6.5 23.1 55.4 69.0 110.9 177.8 152.4 193.3 222.6 229.1 228.5 227.6
Vietnam 0.3 2.4 5.4 14.5 32.4 62.7 57.1 72.2 97.9 114.5 132.0 150.5
ASEAN 71.9 144.1 320.4 430.2 656.6 989.7 813.8 1049.8 1239.5 1253.7 1272.6 1295.3
World 2036.0 3490.0 5168.0 6458.0 10509.0 16160.0 12555.0 15301.0 18338.0 18496.0 18954.0 19002.0
ASEAN % 3.5 4.0 6.2 6.7 6.2 6.1 6.5 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.8
Singapore % 1.0 1.5 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Source: World Trade Organization [2015].
Table 6. Merchandise imports (billion US$)
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Brunei 
Darussalam 0.6 1.0 2.1 1.1 1.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Cambodia 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.9 3.9 6.6 5.8 6.8 9.3 11.4 12.8 13.5
Indonesia 10.8 21.8 40.6 43.6 75.7 127.5 93.8 135.7 177.4 191.7 186.6 178.2
Lao PDR 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.4 3.1 3.0 3.3
Malaysia 10.8 29.3 77.7 82.0 114.3 156.3 123.8 164.6 187.5 196.4 205.9 208.9
Myanmar 0.4 0.3 1.3 2.4 1.9 4.3 4.3 4.8 9.0 9.2 12.0 16.2
The Philippines 8.3 13.0 28.3 37.0 49.8 60.4 45.9 58.5 63.7 65.4 65.1 67.5
Singapore 24.0 60.9 124.5 134.5 200.0 319.8 245.8 310.8 365.8 379.7 373.0 366.3
Thailand 9.2 33.0 70.8 61.9 118.2 179.2 133.7 182.9 228.8 249.1 250.4 228.0
Vietnam 1.3 2.8 8.2 15.6 36.8 80.7 69.9 84.8 106.8 113.8 132.0 149.3
ASEAN 65.6 162.4 355.3 380.6 603.1 997.8 727.0 953.5 1154.3 1223.2 1244.6 1234.7
World 2077.0 3600.0 5285.0 6725.0 10870.0 16572.0 12782.0 15510.0 18503.0 18713.0 19026.0 19091.0
ASEAN % 3.2 4.5 6.7 5.7 5.5 6.0 5.7 6.1 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.5
Singapore % 1.2 1.7 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
Source: World Trade Organization [2015].
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Clearly, the most important is the position of Singapore. It systematically 
maintains the place in the middle of the second ten of the world. More important is 
its role of a sui generis trade hub. Only a part of its exports is domestic exports and 
only part of its imports is retained. In the first case, the share of its own export is 
gradually decreasing, from nearly 60 per cent in the nineties to around 53 per cent in 
2013 and 2014. In the second case, the fall is more violent, from 60.3 per cent in 
1997 to 49.6 per cent in 2003 and 47.3 per cent in 2014. Taking into consideration 
the Singapore’s role in the ASEAN trade, the very important question is: in which 
proportion is Singapore the middleman for ASEAN and non-ASEAN less or more 
distant neighbours? 
In the case of the ASEAN-5 countries, the division is very clear. For Indonesia 
and The Philippines, economic openness index is low, as for the rest, especially for 
Malaysia and Vietnam, it is high [World Bank 2015]1.
But about the most important feature Finn Laursen wrote some years ago in 
Chapter 13 [2010].2 The pattern is very clear in the comparison of the shares of intra-
regional exports of the NAFTA, the EU, the Mercosur, and the ASEAN in the years 
1980-2006. Although the EU remained unrivalled, with the increase from 60.8 per 
cent to 67.2 per cent, the NAFTA narrowed the gap, having increased the share of the 
intra-regional exports from 33.6 per cent to 53.9 per cent (in 2002 even 56.7 per 
cent). And, although the results in the case were even worse, the ASEAN clearly 
lagged behind. Its share increased, from 18.7 per cent in 1980 to above 20 per cent 
in the 90’s and slightly more than 25 per cent in 2006. Laursen concluded: “Actually, 
intra-regional trade did not really increase very much over the last 30 years within 
ASEAN, except possibly in the most recent years (since 2000)” [Laursen 2010, 
p. 240].
In reality, the situation is somewhat worse. We should begin with more data.
Table 7. ASEAN intra-trade shares 1993-2014 (per cent)
1993 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Intra-ASEAN exports % 21,1 23,7 22,8 25,3 25,2 25,3 25,6 24,6 25 26,4 25,8 26 25,4
Intra-ASEAN imports % 17,4 16,8 21,1 24,5 25 24,6 23,9 24,3 25,9 23,6 22,8 22,4 23
Source: based on ASEAN [20154], [2015].
While looking at the above data, it seems that getting the top points – after strong 
increase –- around 2003, and maintaining some stabilization with slight increase 
for some following years till 2008, in the recent years we could hardly detect any 
1 More details regarding trade (% of GDP) may be found there.
2 Especially, Table 13.1 Intra-regional export shares, 1970-2006. there are also two interesting 
texts, From AFTA to ASEAN Economic Community – Is ASEAN Moving towards EU-style Economic 
Integration? [Hwee 2010, pp. 215-26] and China and the East Asian Regional Process [Bingran 2010, 
pp. 227-35]
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growth of the share in exports, as in imports – the fall between 2010 and 2014 is a 
striking one. 
In any case, the ASEAN intra-trade was, and is, very small. There is no 
comparison with the relevant shares of the exports and the imports of the European 
Union, but also of the NAFTA.
The data presented above permits us to see a broad image of the changes in the 
region’s attractiveness for the foreign investors during the recent decades. One 
cautionary remark is necessary; the data includes jointly the investors from the 
countries outside the region, as well as the resident within the ASEAN countries. 
Looking at the FDI inflows between 2006-13 the ASEAN’s contribution is yet more 
modest than in the case of trade, the average being below 16 per cent [ASEAN 2014, 
Tab. VI.2.]. The available space does not permit, however, to enter here into a more 
detailed analysis3. 
The increase of the FDI inward stocks is equally impressive as the changes of 
other basic economic data. Their value jumped from 17.4 in 1980 to nearly 260 in 
2000, nearly 780 in 2008, 1144 in 2010 and above 1687 billion in 2014. As their rate 
3 Anybody interested to begin some further search, should start with the ASEAN Investment Report 
2013-2014. FDI Development and Regional Value Chains, South East Asia Investment Policy Perspec-
tives, OECD December 2014, Foreign Direct Investment into ASEAN in 2010 and, within the ASEAN 
database, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, http://www.asean.org/news/item/foreign-direct-invest-
ment-statistics.
Table 8. FDI inward stocks
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Brunei 
Darussalam 0.01 0.03 0.6 3.9 2.1 2.0 3.5 4.1 4.8 5.7 6.3 6.2
Cambodia 0.04 0.04 0.4 1.6 2.5 3.9 4.8 6.2 3.0 9.4 11.2 13.0
Indonesia 4.6 8.7 20.6 25.1 41.2 72.2 108.8 160.7 184.8 211.6 230.8 253.1
Lao PDR 0.01 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.6
Malaysia 5.2 10.3 28.7 52.7 44.5 73.6 79.0 101.6 115.1 132.7 136.0 133.8
Myanmar 0.02 1.2 3.8 6.5 7.8 7.8 14.5 15.6 16.1 16.7 17.7
The Philippines 1.3 3.3 6.7 13.8 15.0 21.7 22.9 25.9 31.0 36.5 47.3 57.1
Singapore 5.4 30.5 65.6 110.6 237.0 459.0 507.9 632.8 688.8 821.0 869.9 912.4
Thailand 0.9 8.2 17.7 30.9 61.4 94.5 106.9 139.3 155.0 172.4 178.3 199.3
Vietnam 0.3 5.7 14.7 22.4 41.4 49.0 57.0 64.5 72.9 81.8 91.0
ASEAN 17.4 61.6 147.6 257.6 433.2 778.7 892.3 1144.0 1264.9 1480.7 1581.1 1687.1
World 701.2 2197.8 3566.4 7203.8 10988.6 14979.4 17610.0 19607.4 20441.7 22073.2 24483.7 24624.5
ASEAN % 2.5 2.8 4.1 3.7 3.9 5.2 5.0 5.8 6.2 6.7 6.5 6.9
Singapore % 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.5 2.2 3.1 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.7
Source: UNCTAD [2015].
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of growth was strikingly higher than of the world FDI inward stocks, the ASEAN 
share has grown from 2.5 to 6.9 per cent of the world’s total. Even more imposing is 
the position of Singapore, followed by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
Particularly rapid is the growth of the inward stocks in Vietnam, nearly 23 times 
during the last twenty years.
Table 9. Military expenditure
1988 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Indonesia 2.5 2.6 3.5 2.6 3.6 5.1 5.8 8.0 9.0 8.1
Malaysia 1.4 1.8 3.0 2.4 4.5 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.9
The 
Philippines 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.0
Singapore 3.0 3.8 5.3 7.3 8.6 9.3 8.9 8.7 8.9 9.1
Thailand 3.5 3.9 5.2 3.3 3.1 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.6 5.7
Vietnam 1.1 1.7 … … 1.6 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6
ASEAN 13.8 16.1 20.0 18.4 24.4 30.0 31.1 33.3 35.4 35.2
World 1563.0 1502.0 1076.0 1115.0 1416.0 1738.0 1744.0 1740.0 1719.0 1711.0
ASEAN % 0.9 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1
Note: Constant (2011) US$ billion
Source: SIPRI [2015].
Although during gathering of the sources it seemed to be good option to 
concentrate on the economic issues, it would be risky to ignore the military questions. 
Some warnings could be discovered in the summary of the annual report by the 
SIPRI in April. We should notice that the message, as well as the data, were rather 
equivocal. In spite of the fact that East Asia is one the strongest exceptions in the 
world trends in the military expenditures (increase by 76 per cent between 2005-14), 
in the case of South East Asia this rate was significantly lower (45 per cent) [Perlo-
Freeman 2015, p. 3]. Much more important is taking into consideration the absolute 
numbers and assessing them as shares of the GDP and per capita. 
When looking at the part of the military expenditures within the GDP, we could 
find solid tendencies of decrease in Malaysia and Thailand to around 1.5 percent, in 
The Philippines to slightly above 1 per cent and Indonesia slightly below 1 per cent. 
Only in Vietnam about 2.2 per cent and in Singapore about 3.2 per cent of GDP is 
allocated for the military purposes (by the way, even in these countries military 
expenditures take a lot less from the GDP than in the nineties). And hardly possible 
would be (with the significant exception of Singapore) to justify the idea of any arms 
race with the expenditures per capita [Perlo-Freeman 2015, p. 3]. It seems that the 
economic and social development in South East Asia so far is not endangered. 
This does not mean, however, that serious geopolitical and geo-economic 
tensions are not growing. But, first of all, the most urgent is presence at the seas, 
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especially South China Sea. Although not quite alone ones, but nevertheless more 
involved into the territorial disputes with China, the Vietnamese and the Filipino 
peoples maintain their own names, respectively East Sea and, alternately, Luzon Sea 
or West Philippine Sea. But a more important factor seems to be that indeed there is 
a great military confrontation between the United States and China.
Coming back to our main problem, it is possible to conclude that so far the 
region achieved a lot of various success and has quite promising perspectives. These 
developments took place in spite of many vicissitudes. To be honest, it is very 
difficult to find any other part of world so heterogeneous, so full of differences, 
divergences and discrepancies, and so vulnerable. In author’s opinion, the opinion 
that “ASEAN is a group of countries that exhibit extreme asymmetries between 
them” [Laursen 2010, p. 263] still remains valid.
It is possible to discern very complex interplay between the objective 
demographic, ethnic, religious, political, economic, cultural and social realities and 
the processes of institutional integration. 
3. The ASEAN – institutional development
The ASEAN is one of the earliest attempts to follow the example of the European 
Communities. Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established in August 
1967 by five founding members, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. Perhaps the leaders became convinced by the book of Ernst B. Haas 
Beyond the Nation State, but they did not notice the Empty Chair Crisis and the 
Luxembourg Compromise. Only one event in South East Asia in the first two decades 
took place, the admission of Brunei Darussalam in 1982.
Once again under the influence the new developments in West European 
integration, as well as attempted responses in other parts of the world, at the Fourth 
ASEAN Summit meeting in January 1992, ASEAN members signed the Singapore 
Declaration and the Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation, 
which resulted in the formation of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) [ASEAN 
1992 a, b].
The important part was accepted, then the Agreement on the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for AFTA [ASEAN 1992c]. According to it, the 
member states accepted the elimination of quantitative restrictions and other non-
tariff barriers, as well as reduction of tariff rates on intra-trade to 0 – 5 per cent within 
15 years since the beginning of the year 1993.
The Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok at the end of 1995 adopted the Agenda 
for Greater Economic Integration. In the main document the leaders declared: 
“- ASEAN shall further accelerate the progress towards the actualisation of AFTA 
before the target date of Year 2003. Member Countries will maximise the number of 
items with tariffs reduced to 0-5% by the year 2000 as well as expand the number of 
products with tariffs reduced to 0% by the same year; - ASEAN shall remove all 
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quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers and shall schedule the elimination of 
NTBs beginning 1 January 1996” [ASEAN 1995].
Even at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Hanoi at the end 1998, in spite of the 
painful experiences of the East Asian Financial Crisis, the six original member states 
agreed to accelerate the implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, of 
course, with a different timetable for Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar [ASEAN 1998].
Unfortunately, the acceleration took place in the directions not chosen by the 
leaders’. Since 2001, the summits came about each year and since 2007 even twice 
a year (the last one, XXVIth summit was held in April 2015). The ASEAN institutional 
architecture appears to be becoming more and more sophisticated. It is producing a 
lot of documents. But it very difficult to repudiate – even now – hard but justified 
accusation by Yeo Lay Hwee: “ASEAN has never been short of grand declarations 
and initiatives. However, its implementation record of these various initiatives has 
thus far been abysmal” [2010, p. 220].
In the second half of the nineties ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation began, 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the three East Asia nations 
of China, Japan, and South Korea. If the first spurs were related to the Asia-Europe 
(ASEM) meetings (the first summit in Bangkok in March of 1996), and the genuine 
cause became the East Asian Financial Crisis, the process, involving the leaders, 
government ministers and high officials, has been gradually deepened and widened. 
Its successive offspring became the East Asia Summit (EAS). If the origins could 
be found in the idea promoted by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad 
already in 1991, the initial decision was undertaken at the ASEAN+3 Summit in 
Cambodia in 2002. The first summit was held in Kuala Lumpur at the end 2005. 
After, some arguments took place between the initiating countries, yet three countries, 
India, Australia, and New Zealand (all, but especially the first ones, in order to try to 
balance the growing China’s power). The summits are taking place annually (the 
nearest, 10th, should be in November of 2015 in Kuala Lumpur). Since the 6th Summit 
in Bali in November, the number of official members has been increased to 18, after 
inclusion of the United States and Russia.
The last offspring – rather wrongly – remaining in the deep shadows, is the 
proposal of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP 
negotiations were formally launched in November 2012, at the ASEAN Summit in 
Cambodia. In the negotiations, whose recent piece was the third meeting of the 
economic ministers on 24 August 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, 16 countries participate, 
without the United States and Russia [ASEAN 2015].
The two most spectacular outside initiatives of the great significance are the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), promoted by the United States and the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), advanced by China.
The agreement was reached by trade ministers on 5 October 2015 in Atlanta, the 
result of five days of round-the-clock talks and of 10 years of negotiations “a hallmark 
victory” for President Obama, who has pushed for a foreign-policy “pivot” to the 
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Pacific rim [Granville 2015]. The agreement with 11 other Pacific Rim countries 
closed the penultimate phase. Still, it needs ratifications and it became the very 
controversial question in the United States. In the case of final success, it will change 
the conditions for the economic cooperation, also with four ASEAN countries: 
Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei.
The proposal of an Asian infrastructure bank appeared relatively not long ago. 
China’s leader, Xi Jinping, just before the summits of the APEC in Bali and of East 
Asia, becoming the first foreign leader to make a speech in Indonesia’s parliament, 
he surprised nearly everybody with a proposal [The Economist 2013]. It took slightly 
more than one year to gather at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing (24th of 
October, 2014) the leaders of other 21 countries of Asia and the Middle East. All 
ASEAN countries but Indonesia (the new president just then took office) were 
present. So far the AIIB has 57 participating countries of Eurasia, with only few from 
other continents (Egypt, South Africa and Brazil). Perhaps the most striking is the 
absence of two countries, the United States and Japan. It goes without saying that it 
is definitely too early to assess the AIIB perspectives. 
4. ASEAN and its main partners (China, the EU, Japan and the U.S.)
Coming back to current situation, let us begin with four tables showing the 
geographical structure of the ASEAN trade.
Table 10. Exports shares
1993 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
US 10.3 18.5 18.0 14.3 10.5 10.1 9.5 8.6 8.6 9.0 9.6
Japan 15.0 14.4 11.6 9.9 10.8 9.6 9.8 11.7 10.1 9.7 9.3
EU-28 15.2 14.9 15.5 12.5 11.8 11.4 10.9 10.2 10.0 9.8 10.3
China 2.2 2.1 3.5 8.1 9.0 10.1 10.7 10.3 11.3 12.0 12.4
Korea 3.0 2.9 3.5 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.0
India 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.4
Source: ASEAN [September 2015].
Table 11. Import shares
1993 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
US 15.1 14.6 13.9 10.6 9.0 9.2 9.0 8.1 7.5 7.4 7.2
Japan 24.9 24.7 18.8 14.1 11.8 11.4 10.8 11.2 11.2 9.5 8.8
EU-28 14.0 14.6 11.3 10.4 10.0 10.8 9.8 9.4 9.6 9.8 9.3
China 1.9 2.2 5.2 10.6 11.9 13.3 12.4 13.3 14.5 16.0 17.6
Korea 3.2 3.6 4.4 4.1 4.5 5.6 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.6 5.4
India 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.0
Source: ASEAN [September 2015].
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Table 12. Exports shares 2014
Japan China US EU-28 Korea India
Brunei Darusssalam 39.0 1.8 0.3 0.1 12.5 9.1
Cambodia 6.5 4.1 24.1 33.7 1.6 0.1
Indonesia 13.1 10.0 9.4 9.6 6.0 6.9
Lao PDR 2.3 34.2 0.6 5.7 0.4 1.2
Malaysia 10.8 12.0 8.4 9.5 3.7 4.2
Myanmar 3.5 63.0 0.4 1.9 2.3 5.7
The Philippines 22.5 13.0 14.1 10.9 4.1 0.5
Singapore 4.1 12.6 5.9 8.0 4.1 2.7
Thailand 9.6 11.0 10.5 10.2 2.0 2.5
Vietnam 10.3 10.4 20.0 19.5 5.0 1.7
Source: ASEAN [September 2015].
Table 13. Imports shares 2014
Japan China US EU-28 Korea India
Brunei Darussalam 2.6 26.9 8.4 8.2 4.5 0.7
Cambodia 1.6 20.6 2.1 2.4 4.1 1.0
Indonesia 9.5 17.2 4.6 7.1 6.6 2.2
Lao PDR 1.9 25.6 0.4 2.5 2.2 0.9
Malaysia 8.0 16.9 7.7 10.4 4.6 2.0
Myanmar 5.4 42.4 0.4 2.5 3.6 3.9
The Philippines 8.0 15.0 8.7 11.7 7.8 1.5
Singapore 5.5 12.1 10.3 12.0 5.9 2.3
Thailand 15.6 16.9 6.4 8.5 3.8 1.3
Vietnam 8.9 30.3 4.3 6.2 15.0 2.2
Source: ASEAN [September 2015].
The declining share in exports as well as in imports of the region, with the 
significant differences in the time and in its scale, in the case of the United States, 
Japan and the European Union, is not quite surprising. Similarly, the differences in 
the scale of growth of China’s share in exports and imports of the ASEAN, as an 
entity, should not surprise. It is worthwhile to notice that in 2014 China became the 
supplier number one in imports for all countries, but in exports it is the most important 
market for five countries (including Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand), as Japan 
remains such a market for three countries (including Indonesia and The Philippines), 
and the United States and the European Union respectively for Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Special attention should be paid to the fact that a turning point for China 
as a trade partner in South East Asia, took place quite recently, around 2005. It is 
quite easy to notice that Korea and especially India remain clearly behind the first 
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foursome. But equally important is the fact that the total share of these six trade 
partners is fairly stable, between 49 and 56 per cent in the exports and 50 and 60 per 
cent in the imports.
Having gathered data on FDI inflows, it was decided against presenting them in 
the form of a table. The main reason is that although the value of them is not quite 
low (in years 2006-13 it amounted to 681 US$ billion), more than a half (343,1) 
came in Singapore. The next were Indonesia (96.6), Thailand (70.1), Malaysia (66.1) 
and Vietnam (59.1). Yet, amongst the FDI home countries, the strongest seem to be 
some belonging to the European Union and Japan, as The United States remain 
clearly behind. China is growing as an investor, but the distance is noticeable.
Even in such a brief outline of the problems appears to be a serious mistake to 
omit two determinants. Having exhausted all the space already, let us replace the 
impossible deliberations with two, indeed telling, maps.
Fig. 1. Power and responsibility. The Mekong River Commission and Lower Mekong mainstream dams
Source: Lee and Scurrah [2009].
To attempt any conclusion is very risky task. It seems that the region, so dynamic 
and full of contradictions, is worthy to be studied at least so much as the great powers 
pay their attention to it. The balance sheet for recent decades is favourable. In spite 
of many vicissitudes South East Asia is now better developed and more capable to 
face even serious challenges than it was twenty or more years ago. Of course the 
ASEAN have not managed to transform the region into “a single production unit” 
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[The Chinese University of Hong Kong 2015]. It was simple “impossible mission”. 
Even more, it is rather difficult to identify genuine successes in the field of “domestic” 
policies.
Quite different I assess its complex relations with the outside world. To be honest, 
I see the ASEAN as – at the same time – the subject and the object of geopolitics and 
– to a degree – of geo-economics. But, with so numerous vulnerabilities, the ASEAN 
appears nevertheless to punch above its weight.
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